All posts by Armin Haas

Sustainability, Finance, and a Proposal from China

During the Second Open Global Systems Science Conference in Brussels, June 10-12 2013, we are going to introduce and make available our paper entitled “Sustainability, Finance, and a Proposal from China”.

In this paper, we deal with one of the most interesting contributions to the debate about the global financial crisis. This contribution is a brief note by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China. It represents one of the very few attempts to place the present financial crisis within a long-term historical perspective. We highlight that striving for global financial governance is a paradigmatic example of a deeper underlying sustainability challenge.

You can download our paper here.

Evidence Based Policy

Dear Colleagues,

I want to make you aware of a very interesting post discussing the issue of evidence-based policy by using the example of hurricane Sandy.

Here comes my appetizer from the post:

“As a case study in the application of “evidence-based policy” you won’t find a better one than the hurricane deductible. Sometimes “evidence” matters, sometimes it does not. Sometime we care about whether it matters, sometimes we do not.”

And here comes the link:

Hope and Fear

I very much enjoyed Brad’s talk yesterday. I understand that he put forward the hypothesis that in recent years, typically two means were combined for making the public aware of an issue:
i) oversimplify the issue;
ii) dramatise it as an essential threat.

For quite some time, I have been wondering whether this is the only way for achieving public awareness, and whether it is a good way of actually addressing an issue of concern.

I think just threatening people is sub-optimal. Hope is a much more powerful incentive than fear, at least I think it is a more sustainable one. Or, in a more moderate tone: When fear is balanced by hope, one can mobilise people much better.

As a child of the cold war, I want to refer to two historical cases:

1. The cold war in general. At one hand, there was the Sowjet threat. On the other hand, there was a great vision: Freedom and prosperity for all nations.

1. The Sputnik shock. At one hand, it was the Sowjet threat that mobilised forces. On the other hand, Kennedy reacted by proposing an inspiring vision: Bringing a man to the moon.

It may sound strange when I speak about the spirits of the 60s, as I was only a child in those day. Nevertheless, being born in 1962, I still experienced the mood of the day, i.e. what I perceive as the last period in Western history of a fundamental and widespread hope that things will, overall, be ever improving. This mood gave way to the despair of the 70s, at least this is how I experienced the 70s.

If my analysis is right, there is a lesson to learn for the sustainability community. At least I try to lead by example and highlight the possibilities that lie ahead instead of threatening people into action.

I am curious about your opinion on all this.

The Next Enlightenment

Dear Colleagues,

I want to build on what I have voiced yesterday when speaking about the need for a next enlightenment. As I have indicated, I think that we need to help people educate themselves about how to deal with large scale uncertainties.

There are several issues I would like to highlight:

- I have consciously phrased above “help people educate themselves”. This refers to Humboldt’s idea that it should not be academics who educate scholars, but human beings who educate themselves. It also refers to Humboldt’s idea that education is not identical to training people in specific professional skills, but means to grow as individual and become a person who is able to use her reason without external assistance. Clearly, this refers to Kant’s concept of enlightenment.

- I think that one of the biggest challenges for policy- and decision-makers is dealing with large scale uncertainties. Just developing some fancy tools that build on today’s risk tools will not do the job as today’s risk tools are severely limited. Many of them build on the frequentist notion of probability. They do a reasonable job when a sufficient amount of data is available, and when one can expect that the system that generated this data will not undergo substantial changes.

- For many global systems, we expect them to undergo substantial changes in the future. These changes will “devalue” the data from the past and subsequently devalue risk tools that need past data for projecting future risks. Instead, we need concepts and tools that help us build expertise about global systems, their future dynamics, and the uncertainties involved.

- Quick fixes will not do the job. I expect that we will need a further “round” of the enlightenment, which I like to denote as enlightenment 2.0, and which I expect to last for another 250 years. If, in 2250, we will have accomplished a decent job in dealing with global systems, more challenges will await us. Enlightenment 2.0 is only the next step. But as the Chinese say: The longest journey begins with the first step. I suggest to make the second one.

Report from a break-out group

When our break-out group met, we started by individually putting down three kind of issues on colour-coded cards. We used green ones for putting down advantages and opportunities, red ones for risks and dangers, and yellow ones for questions that need further research. Moreover, we separately dealt with the short term dimension and the long term dimension of Governor Zhou’s proposal, respectively. When everyone had finished, we displayed the cards on two black boards, one for the short term, and one for the long term, and started a discussion. For your convenience, here you can find the documentation of what we gathered on the black board.

The number of yellow cards was biggest, followed by the green ones, with the red ones being in smallest number. The discussion was even more pronounced as we mostly discussed the questions that need further research. It was a lively and complex discussion. For this post, I do not aim at delivering a comprehensive overview of our discussion. Instead, I just want to highlight some of the issues that I found most remarkable:

  1. Their was wide agreement that current account imbalances and the relation of the financial system to the real economy are important issues.
  2. The issue was raised that it is not clear what caused the financial crisis. If one starts from this presumption, it is not clear whether Governor Zhou’s proposal could be a remedy for the financial crisis.
  3. If we found a mechanism other than using a supra-national reserve currency for keeping current account imbalances in check, there would be no need for large currency reserves. It is neither clear whether in such a situation there is a need for a supra-national reserve currency at all, nor whether the fact that a supra-national reserve currency would not be that important would make it much easier to establish it.
  4. If it is worthwhile to establish a supra-national reserve currency, it is not clear whether it is a good idea to link it to commodities.
  5. Today, there is the principle: one goal, one instrument. One thing is whether this principle is a good idea in itself. This notwithstanding, the group discussed whether it is a good idea to invent a complex instrument for simultaneously addressing several goals.
  6. Eventually, I asked the group members the following question: When Governor Zhou’s talks about the long term, how many years do you think we speak about? The response to my questions was: Four group members answered 10 years,  two answered 20 years, another two answered 50 years.

Some Remarks on Governor Zhou’s Suggestion to Reform the International Monetary System

By Armin Haas and Ulf Dahlsten


Two Challenges

As a prerequisite for sustainable development of both developed and developing societies, we need sustainable financial markets. We deliberately use this notion in two meanings. The meaning familiar to the business and academic sustainable finance community is the instrumental use of financial markets for bringing about a transition from an ecologically unsustainable “real” economy towards a sustainable one. The other meaning is the long-term resilience/stability/viability of financial markets. Concerning the resilience dimension, we identify two major challenges:

i) The first challenge is that since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system and the liberalization of the financial markets, there is no financial mechanism for keeping current accounts balanced. The Euro experience is telling in this respect. Without a mechanism that gives incentives to counteract current account imbalances that occur for whatever reason, current account imbalances tend to fuel themselves and eventually render the whole system unsustainable.

ii) The second challenge is a progressive decoupling of financial markets from the real economy. Several metrics show this phenomenon. The growth rate of many indices measuring assets values, for example stock price, commodity price, or house price indices, was way above the real growth rate of the economic entities the indices are based on. The Bank for International Settlements, for example, follows the volume of cross-border transactions; while transactions for export and import have grown linearly, the purely financial transactions have, after a temporary backlash, continued to swell in a significant way. Such transactions now amount to 98 % of all transactions. (See figure 1) The financial speculation in commodity markets is also mounting, in this case exponentially (See figure 2).

This is a dangerous development as the progressing self-referentiality of financial markets threatens their ability of actually controlling the proper working of the real sector. The fact that five years of on-going financial crisis have not been “sufficient” to substantially change the picture and align the financial and the real sphere again is telling about the magnitude of the problem.

Figure 1: Daily cross-border payments in Billion USD
Source: The Bank of International Settlements (BIS)


Figure 2: Number of annual trades by commodity, 1996–2011
Source: Maystre and Bicchetti (2012)


Historic Approaches for Dealing with these Challenges

Also in the time of the Gold standard, these two challenges had to be addressed. Between the wars, ongoing problems with destabilizing current account imbalances where are major issue. Keynes was well aware of the fact that for stabilizing the world financial system after the ending of WWII, innovative solutions would be needed.  When conceiving his Bancor as a supra-national reserve currency, he therefore worked out a mechanism for keeping current account imbalances in check.  In the wake of Keynes work, several other proposals, like the work of Kaldor, suggested mechanisms for addressing the current account challenge.

Concerning the coupling of the financial sphere and the real economy, there are basically three approaches and respective traditions for addressing this challenge. One approach is to use precious metals, i.e. silver or gold, for backing currencies. An alternative approach is to use a basket of commodities for the same purpose. This basket could include precious metals, but only to a certain extent. A third alternative is to issue money by buying or using as collateral commercial papers, i.e. financial assets that originate from economic operations in the real sector.


After Bretton Woods

Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the world financial system operates with no mechanism for addressing the two challenges. Instead, two approaches gained widespread acceptance, i.e. monetarism and the idea that financial markets are basically self-regulating. Until the outbreak of the contemporary financial and economic crises, the practical consequence of the dominance of these approaches was that most financial actors, i.e. politicians, regulators, central bankers, and decision makers in the financial sector, did not see a necessity for installing mechanisms for addressing the two challenges that we sketched above. After the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, the situation has changed. We currently witness the beginning of a debate of how to organize the financial system in the decades to come. One important school of thought suggests that in the decades to come, the US Dollar will loose its role of major world reserve currency, giving way to a multi-polar system in which several regionally dominating currencies will be used as reserve currencies. A possible future world could, for example, see a tri-polar structure using the US Dollar, the Euro (however the Euro will be organized), and the Chinese Renminbi as reserve currencies. However, it is not clear how such a scenario could evolve or be managed. The People’s Bank of China is presently carefully increasing the convertibility of the Renminbi. Many expect that it will be fully convertible in a relatively near future, at the latest when China surpasses the US as the world’s largest economy, something the IMF predicts will happen before 2020. If there is no managed process in place, there is a risk is that there will be an uncontrolled flight from the Dollar to the Renminbi, in practice establishing the Chinese currency as a new reserve currency. Such a disruptive development could create financial instability with unforeseen consequences.


The Chinese Proposal

It is important to understand that the proposal that Governor Zhou made in 2009 envisions an alternative future. Under the impression of the contemporary financial and economic crisis, he suggests to create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and managed by a global institution. Moreover, this currency should be organized so as to be able to remain stable in the long run. He thus wants to overcome the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies.

A striking aspect of Governor Zhou’s proposal is that he conceives China as a nation that endorses international co-operation when it comes to re-organizing the World financial system. This is in contrast to the view that China will, descriptively speaking, or should, normatively speaking, establish the Renminbi as dominating World reserve currency in the future. Both the descriptive as well as the normative view build on the expectation that China is set to grow into the World biggest economy.

Governor Zhou explicitly builds his proposal on Keynes’ Bancor concept developed in the 1940s. He is well aware of the fact that the creation of an international currency unit along the lines of Keynes’ proposal is a bold initiative that requires extraordinary political vision and courage and will take a long time.

In a pragmatic perspective, Governor Zhou suggests to use a gradual process that is guided by a grand vision and builds on what is currently already established. In particular, he suggests giving the Special Drawing Rights a greater role and broadening the scope of using them with the eventual goal of developing SDR to a point so that they satisfy countries’ demand for a reserve currency.

Governor Zhou does not explicitly discuss how to address the two challenges that we discuss above. He does, however, make it clear that his grand vision includes establishing a stable valuation benchmark. Moreover, he states that the allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a purely calculation-based system to a system backed by real assets, such as a reserve pool.

As Keynes’ original proposal came with an explicit mechanism for keeping current account imbalances in check, and as Governor Zhou envisions establishing a stable valuation benchmark, we think that he is very well aware of the two challenges and the need to explicitly address them. Thus, his proposal is in sharp contrast to the above-mentioned vision of a multi-polar world that comes without established mechanisms for addressing the two challenges.